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Balancing act — the tightrope of
corporate governance reform
compliance. It can be distinguished from the
ASX’s annual surveys of corporate governance
reporting and provides evidence to support some
of the findings of those surveys.1 The research also
offers qualitative support for recent corporate
governance surveys conducted by CSA.2
The ultimate aim of the project was to
discover how corporate governance might add
value to companies, both in terms of
accountability and performance. The research was
carried out in partnership with Dibbs Abbott
Stillman Lawyers and received funding from the
Australian Research Council.
This article examines some of the highlights of
the research. In light of the changes made by
companies, it considers whether Australia has
found the right balance in its corporate
governance regime. On the basis that both the
costs and benefits are difficult to precisely pin
down, it is not an easy balancing act to achieve.
Nevertheless, Australia appears to be on the right
track in terms of developing a useful and well-
balanced corporate governance system.
The research methodology
The research adopted a triangulated approach
drawing upon three mutually reinforcing sources
of data:
• a series of semi-structured interviews held with
representatives of a wide ranging sample of 
67 companies
• annual financial reports, company website
information and other public statements on
corporate governance released by each
participating company and
• a series of workshops with leading corporate
governance practitioners held at different
stages of the research, used to obtain advice
and input on the research direction and
questions, the data collected and the scope of
the research. 
The research was conducted over the period
2005 to 2007 and represents the most in-depth
analysis of corporate governance practice yet
completed in Australia. It involved interviews with
Over the last five years, corporate governancehas proved an insistent issue in the
boardrooms of Australia. In March 2003, the
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate
Governance Council launched its Principles of Good
Corporate Governance and Best Practice
Recommendations (the guidelines). The following
year amendments to the Corporations Act 2001
came into force, designed to improve corporate
accountability and auditing practices. In annual
reports for 2004–2005, Australian corporations
were asked to disclose more information about
their corporate governance practices than ever
before. This prompted a review of existing
governance structures and procedures against
those recommended or required by the new
regulation. 
A research team at the Centre for Corporate
Governance at the University of Technology,
Sydney, has spent the last three years examining
the extent to which the Australian corporate
governance reforms have caused changes at a
practical level within companies. The study,
entitled The Changing Roles and Responsibilities of
Company Boards and Directors, focused on
qualitative changes in thinking and behaviour
rather than on quantitative measures of
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• Research study finds that Australian
companies are developing useful and
balanced governance systems
• Their key costs are board time ensuring
that appropriate structures are in place
and professional experts
• Benefits include improved definition of
risks and the relationship between 
board and management
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corporate officers, mostly company secretaries and
directors of companies. The sample consisted of
leading members of the ASX including BHP Billiton,
National Australia Bank, Westpac, Fosters and
Westfield; representatives of the ASX 300 including
Adelaide Bank, Commander Communications and
Transfield Services; small listed
corporations including Cheviot
Bridge and Engin; as well as
recently-listed companies; and a
selection of international and
private corporations. 
As a whole this sample
represented the life cycle of
corporate governance from the
basic problems of establishing a
listed company, to developing
extensive systems of performance
and accountability in the mature
corporation. The sample of
companies was constructed with
reference to the industry
workshops and the original
spread of target companies stated
in the ARC applications, based on the prevailing
literature. The response rate to requests for
interviews was approximately 12 per cent, which is
higher than research questionnaires, which are 
often around 7 per cent response rates. 
The companies also spanned a wide range of
industries and geographical locations: from mining
to medical technology; and from Perth to Brisbane.
Each interviewee was asked a series of questions
about how corporate governance was implemented
within their company. The questions were broadly
developed from the guidelines in consultation with
workshop members, and explored recent changes in
corporate governance structures and processes
focusing on the changing behaviour and values of
boards and directors. Prior to each interview a
detailed report was produced, providing all of the
publicly available information regarding the
corporate governance of the company concerned in
answer to the questions to be considered in the
interview, this was provided in advance to the
interviewee to allow the discussion to concentrate
on the interpretation and analysis of the governance
changes that had occurred.3
Summary of research findings
For most companies, implementation of corporate
governance regulation proved a gradual process of
formalisation and improvement rather than an
outright transformation. Across all sectors of
Australian business surveyed, there was evidence of
intelligent engagement in corporate governance and
professionalism in its implementation. To a degree
this may have been a reflection of the interest in
corporate governance of the companies and
interviewees, the majority of whom demonstrated
themselves to be highly informed directors,
company secretaries and legal counsel.
Engagement with the guidelines has proved a
positive process in this sample of companies and to
a large extent they have tailored their
corporate governance structures to fit the
needs of the organisation. Risk
management systems had an obvious value
in improving information flow and
promoting better decision-making.
The research clearly revealed that the
corporate governance practices appropriate
for a company change as the business
grows and develops. The governance needs
of start-up companies and small enterprises
are very different from those of mature ASX
100 companies. The role of the board and
directors changes over time and board
composition ought to reflect the needs of
the company rather than conforming to
any particular formula.
Corporate governance reform
The ultimate objective of the research was to provide
valuable insights into the response of Australian
corporations to recent regulatory reform. For some
years, governments worldwide have actively
increased corporate regulation in an attempt to
reduce risk and restore the confidence of investors.
In the US, the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 was
enacted in response to the costly disasters of Enron,
WorldCom and other corporate failures. The UK
issued an updated version of its Combined Code on
Corporate Governance following the findings of the
2003 Higgs Report, and having conducted an
extensive Modern Company Law review, issued the
Companies Act 2006 (UK) which revised the duties of
company directors. 
In Australia, amendments to the Corporations Act
2001 came into force in 2004 taking into account
the results of the Royal Commission investigation
into the collapse of HIH Insurance.4 The
amendments are commonly known as CLERP 9, 
the ninth policy paper in the Commonwealth
Government’s Corporate Law Economic Reform
Program. Also in March 2003, the ASX Corporate
Governance Council launched the guidelines as a
practical guide for listed companies. These have
since been the focus of public consultation and a
second edition was released in August 2007. The
changes to the guidelines are not substantial: they
have been streamlined and clarified rather than
fundamentally altered. Figure 1 provides a summary
of the Australian reform process, from the Strictly
Boardroom report in 1993 to this recent review of the
guidelines.















The guidelines are not mandatory, enshrining the
‘if not, why not’ or ‘comply or explain’ principle
by which companies that do not wish to comply
with particular guidelines can explain their
reasons for non-compliance to the market. This
was first applied in the UK 1992 Cadbury Report.
This kind of market regulation can be less costly
to comply with than prescriptive legislation
because it acknowledges that one size does not
always fit all. In contrast to black letter law, the
guidelines are more adaptable to changes in best
practice and easier to keep up-to-date and
relevant. Additional advantages include the fact
that the guidelines were able to be produced
relatively quickly and were designed by experts
with relevant industry knowledge, who together
represented every part of the investment and
corporate value chain.
The alternative regulatory approach of using
prescriptive law has been adopted historically by
the United States. Continuing this legal tradition,
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) prescribes
governance practices that must be followed and
which can be enforced by way of penalties for
non-compliance.5 SOX was a direct response to
the collapses of Enron and WorldCom and has
been widely criticised as a knee-jerk reaction that
imposes unreasonable costs on business. A
concern of the rules based approach of SOX is
that it has encouraged, both internally and
externally, a heavily bureaucratised technical
approach to auditing, that makes for inflexible
processes and involves significant costs.6
In contrast, principles-based approaches are not
as rigid in implementation, and improvements in
standards of practice can be encouraged over time.
Principles work to influence a broad set of practices
meeting the expectations of the stakeholder
community at large. 
The debate on regulation in
Australia
The debate about the need for regulation on the
one hand, and the burden that regulation imposes
on the other, is a long running one in Australia
and other countries. However most criticisms of
over-regulation encountered in this research were
not about corporate governance regulation per se.
Participants complained about regulation in the
areas of occupational health and safety, financial
services, food and drug safety, local government
planning, accounting standards and money
laundering but very few expressed negative views
about Australian corporate governance regulation: 
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• In Australia, my view is that where we are
now is about where we want to be. If we
take it a few steps further companies will 
no longer be in control of themselves —
their destiny would be in the regulators’
hands, which is not where it should be.
• We welcome the approach of the ASX
principles-based regulation — it makes it
much easier for me to say — this is the
principle — if this was known would it
change the share price?
• The major costs have been in regulatory
compliance rather than corporate
governance, if you can separate them out.
Interviewees regarded the United States
corporate governance regulation as a different
matter. All participants who had been affected by
SOX, particularly because of a US listing, said that it
was out of proportion and very costly. Perhaps the
favourable view of the Australian regime is a
consequence of the belief that the alternative could
be a lot worse:
• I don’t think Australia’s reforms are too bad.
SOX is a great overcompensation — the
cost has been extraordinary. Certainly it’s
cost us half a million and the ongoing
things — internal and external auditors etc.
• The Section 404 certificate for SOX on
internal controls has been a painful process,
very expensive and has not produced
anything worthwhile.
The prime reason why SOX is disliked is because
companies feel that the costs outweigh the benefits.
It is this cost-benefit equation that determines
whether regulation is seen as good or bad; whether
the company feels regulated or over-regulated. The
fact that there was little complaint about the
guidelines suggests that they have, for the most part,
succeeded in finding the right cost-benefit ratio.
One of the most surprising aspects of the
research was the lack of concern over the costs
involved in implementing corporate governance
reform. The majority of participants said the costs
had been minimal, although often after some
thought they came up with some indirect costs that
could be linked to governance changes. Many
respondents suggested the costs were largely up-
front, and would not be significant once the new
governance systems were well established. The
participants’ inability to provide specific cost
information may be because expenses are
amorphous and hard to identify: 
• Minimal. We’ve involved solicitors in
reviewing and drafting but it is a once-off
cost and we will capitalise on the benefits
— so, minimal.
• There have been no great costs. Not
directly at least, maybe the board and
management time spent on it.
The most common cost raised by participants
was time, often their own personal time as sole
company secretary in charge of governance and
compliance, but also board time which they felt
could perhaps be better spent on other matters.
• Time. We’ve not used any externals because
we were tight on cash but it’s taken up a
lot of my time.
• The biggest cost has been my relationship
with my wife from working all these hours!
So, yes, time. It had to be done, though —
we now have a good structure for the
future.
• The real cost is how much board time goes
into it — that is more significant,
particularly at committee level.
Also, where external consultants had been used
to implement new risk or remuneration systems
costs were often quite high. These were likely to be a
one-off cost and thus may only have been top-of-
mind in companies where changes had only recently
been implemented:
• The only extreme cost is the expert
remuneration consultants — we have paid
them at least $100,000.
• The risk management and additional
reporting have incurred a significant cost —
I’d say the first phase cost a million,
probably more.
• There have been costs — legal fees and on
the risk management side we have had
independent experts come in to test our
systems. It is difficult to put a quantum to it.
Participants welcomed recent efforts to simplify
regulation and reduce costs, particularly the smaller
companies. For example, the majority said they
would take advantage of the option of online annual
reports under the Corporations Legislations
Amendment (Simpler Regulatory System) Act 2007
which received royal assent on 28 June 2007. The
changes to the guidelines are also likely to be
welcomed on the basis that many participants
complained about overlapping and inconsistent
regulation.
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Offsetting the costs of implementing corporate
governance changes were the benefits seen by
companies. Again, these were difficult to identify
but tended to reflect the major changes that
companies had made. Clearly, they were taking
advantage of the flexibility of the guidelines, only
making significant changes in the areas where
they saw value:
• Being forced to spell out the financial
and operating risks is a very good thing
to assist you to think of all the risks.
• The CRO has really enhanced our risk
focus — brought it to top of mind. There
has been streamlining and consolidation
of policies.
• It has vastly improved the relationship
between the board and management.
There is better understanding of the roles
of the two — much smoother operation
of the board and management’s
interaction with it. Much less harping
and carping.
• Certainly it has introduced discipline — a
more disciplined approach to decision-




A tension between accountability and
performance has always existed in corporate
governance. Evidence from a survey conducted by
Chartered Secretaries Australia in 2004 suggested a
compliance mode continued to prevail in Australia
with 20 per cent of companies implementing
recommended practices, whether or not they
would actually add value.7 This pressure to
conform was also revealed by the two reviews
carried out by the ASX’s Implementation Review
Group (IRG).8 Feedback from companies of all
sizes, professional advisers and analysts suggested
that companies felt compelled to conform to the
guidelines or else face potential controversy. One
factor contributing to this ‘conform rather than
explain’ mentality was the perception that
investment benchmarking would favour those
companies that conformed to the guidelines. This
kind of compliance approach can critically
undermine the effectiveness of governance, and
potentially create a void of meaningless routine.
The UTS research was aimed at understanding
whether companies still felt a pressure to conform
or whether they were making the most of the
inherent flexibility of the guidelines. The research
supports the IRG’s findings that the market forces
created by ‘box-ticking’ investors could be a
significant part of the problem:
• You are tarnished by not complying. The
principles are often seen as the
benchmark — what you should be
doing.
• The incentive to conform to guidelines
appears to come from a desire to avoid
spending time on questions from
shareholders that relate to what are seen
to be minor issues.
• It’s the institutions who force you to tick
the boxes. They say they’ll vote no if they
can’t tick all the boxes.
• It’s a lot less trouble if you do comply so
most give up on the ‘why-nots’
eventually, even if they do it for the first
few years.
As argued above, the guidelines do not mandate
or prescribe best practices. Rather they are designed
to encourage good governance systems and practice
via market mechanisms. Cadbury and Milstein have
pointed out that the effectiveness of the system
depends upon the extent to which shareholders are
prepared to use their influence in support of
governance recommendations. It seems we need to
add to this principle the important qualification
that the effectiveness of the system also depends
upon shareholder engagement being intelligent and
informed and not based on inflexible and
inappropriate governance templates and checklists.
Corporate social responsibility
The one field in which Australian business appears
to be falling behind the performance of other
countries is in the reporting of corporate social
responsibility and sustainability. The research
discovered many examples of extensive
commitment to corporate social responsibility and
sustainability in both large corporations and in
small enterprises. Although the balance of opinion
remains in favour of voluntary rather than
mandatory reporting, the lack of a framework for
reporting and greater impetus to use this, suggests
businesses here will not be reporting as
comprehensively as in the UK, Europe and Japan.
• I don’t think mandatory reporting would
be welcomed — we are already heavily
regulated. This is largely left to the
environmental consciousness of the
board and management.
• Mandatory reporting has not been
discussed by the board although we are
putting a steering committee on the
issue. I think they would take a pragmatic
approach and would prefer voluntary
rather than mandatory reporting.
Key Issues C O M PA N Y  S E C R E TA R Y  c o n t i n u e d
653
Conclusion
The results of this research suggest the standards of
corporate governance in Australia are very high.
Certainly as far as the companies in this research
sample are concerned this country has struck the
right balance between self-regulation and black-
letter law. There was much comparison with the US
regime which is generally thought to have failed in
finding that balance by being too prescriptive and
costly for smaller companies. 
In contrast to the controversy often raised in the
business press in Australia about the huge costs
involved in governance regulation, in this survey
few participants said that corporate governance
reform had caused them to incur significant costs.
The ‘if not, why not’ regime permits flexibility and
individuality but forces companies to consider and
justify their practices (explanations that investors
must be encouraged to consider more
sympathetically). 
Having achieved major strides forward in
putting corporate governance in order in Australian
companies, there is, as yet, less evidence of the
energy necessary to achieve world class standards on
such a comprehensive basis in the implementation
of corporate social responsibility. 
Alice Klettner can be contacted on (02) 9514 3080 or
via email at alice.klettner@uts.edu.au. Thomas Clarke
can be contacted on (02) 9514 3479 or via email 
at t.clarke@uts.edu.au. Michael Adams can be 
contacted on (02) 9685 9123 or via email at
Michael.Adams@uws.edu.au. 
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